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T
he peak of the global financial crisis and Great Recession witnessed the 
largest fall in international trade since the Great Depression, as imports and 
exports contracted by nearly 30 percent relative to GDP.  The blue bars in Figure 1  
show this drop for groups of countries during the peak of the crisis, between 
October 2008 and January 2009.  The collapse of trade in those months is  
astonishing when compared with the decline during other recessions.
Several factors are responsible for the plunge; a 2010 article in The Regional 
Economist discussed the likely culprits but concluded at that time that there was 
no one smoking gun.1  Today, there is some consensus among economists that 
demand for intermediate goods (such as machinery parts and food ingredients) 
and durable goods (such as cars and appliances) played a large role; purchases of 
these goods are relatively easy to postpone by households and firms during tough 
times.  Research by economists Jonathan Eaton, Samuel Kortum, Brent Neiman 
and John Romalis attributes more than 70 percent of the decline in trade during 
the Great Recession to the large drop in demand and, particularly, to the  
collapse of expenditures on durable goods.2  This leaves room for other factors to 
explain the remaining 30 percent, and many economists agree that this share is 
explained, at least in part, by the collapse of trade finance during the crisis.
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Why Do Exporters Need Trade  
Finance?  What Is It? 
Most firms rely on external capital (as 
opposed to their own capital, internal cash 
flows and reinvested earnings) to finance 
fixed costs—such as research and develop-
ment, advertising, fixed capital equipment—
and also to finance intermediate input 
purchases, inventories, payments to workers 
and other frequent costs before sales and 
payments of their output take place. 
As explained by economists Davin Chor 
and Kalina Manova, export activities entail 
extra upfront expenditures that may force 
firms to rely on external finance.
3  Extra 
money may be needed, for example, to 
research the profitability of new export mar-
kets; to make market-specific investments in 
capacity, product customization and regula-
tory compliance; and to set up and maintain 
foreign distribution networks.
Exporting activities may also generate 
additional variable trade costs due to ship-
ping, duties and freight insurance, some of 
which are incurred before export revenue is 
realized.  In addition, cross-border delivery 
can take longer to complete than domes-
tic orders, increasing the need for work-
ing capital requirements relative to those 
of firms that sell only domestically.  For 
example, ocean transit shipping times can 
be as long as several weeks, during which 
the exporting firm typically would be wait-
ing for payment.
4
Accordingly, financial institutions and 
governments have developed instruments to 
provide so-called trade finance, i.e., finan-
cial instruments that are used and some-
times tailored to satisfy exporters’ needs.  
Most of these contracts require some form 
of collateral, e.g., tangible assets, including 
inventories.  The role of trade finance in 
international trade is quantitatively impor-
tant:  Some estimates report that up to 90 
percent of world trade relies on one or more 
trade finance instruments.
5
Banks and other institutions provide 
trade finance for two purposes.  First, trade 
finance serves as a source of working capital 
for individual traders and international 
companies in need of liquid assets.  Second, 
trade finance provides credit insurance 
against the risks involved in international 
trade, such as price or currency fluctuations, 
or political risk.  Each of these two func-
tions is fulfilled by a certain set of credit 
instruments, provided mostly by financial 
institutions but sometimes also by govern-
ment institutions.
FIGURE 1
Changes in Exports and Trade Finance between October 2008 and January 2009
source: asmondson et al.
By Groups of countries (percent decline)
There is a distinction between 
trade credit and trade finance.  
Trade credit is an agreement 
whereby a customer can purchase 
goods on account (without paying 
cash), paying the supplier at a later 
date.  Usually when the goods are 
delivered, a trade credit is given 
for a specific number of days— 
30, 60 or 90—and it is recorded in 
the accounts receivable section of 
the firm’s balance sheet.  Several 
firms record trade credit but are 
not engaged in international trade.  
Trade finance generally refers to 
formal borrowing by firms from 
financial institutions and govern-
ments to facilitate international 
trade activities.
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Finance Instruments
One of the most widely used ways export-
ers rely on trade finance is through docu-
mentary credit, which relies on commercial 
letters of credit.  With this instrument, the 
issuing bank states its commitment to pay 
the beneficiary (exporter) a given amount 
of money on behalf of the buyer (importer) 
as long as the seller complies with the terms 
and conditions in the sale contract.  The 
key steps in the use of letters of credit are 
represented in Figure 2.  On the one hand, 
this instrument allows the importer to use 
his cash flow for alternative purposes rather 
than for paying the exporter for a certain 
period.  On the other hand, the letter of 
credit ensures that the exporter will be paid 
in a timely manner.  This instrument is par-
ticularly suitable for international contracts 
that are difficult to enforce and riskier than 
domestic contracts because the creditwor-
thiness of the foreign counterparty is hard 
to evaluate. 
Some exporters also rely on bill avalisa-
tion, whereby the buyer’s bank guarantees 
payment to the seller in case the buyer will 
not pay.  Other examples of documentary 
credit are advance payment guarantees, 
customs bonds (which allow for the post-
ponement of tax payments until the goods 
are sold) and customs bonds for temporary 
transit (which waive payment of duties if 
goods are imported with the intent of  
being exported). 
In other cases, trade finance is part of 
generic credit to buyer or supplier.  Credit 
counters the off-balance-sheet financing 
provided by documentary credit and repre-
sents the more traditional form of lending.  
It may happen in the form of providing 
working capital, overdraft facilities or term 
loan facilities.
Another group of instruments includes 
countertrade arrangements, which are 
used in situations and countries in which 
a shortage of foreign exchange reserves 
or liquid assets may prevent exchange of 
goods for money.  Under such arrange-
ments, buyer and seller agree that goods 
will be traded at a fixed value without 
involving the use of cash or credit terms; 
instead, barter-exchange, counterpur-
chase or buyback promises will be used.  
For example, countertrade emerged as an 
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payment guaranteed  
by the letter of credit
Step 3
source:  adapted from asmondson et al.
letters of credit are probably the most widely used instrument in trade financing.  on behalf of the 
buyer (importer), the issuing bank commits (Step 1) to pay the beneficiary (exporter) a given amount 
of money as long as the seller complies with the contract.  a confirmation of this letter is sent to the 
exporter’s bank (also Step 1).  the exporter then ships the product to the importer (Step 2).  payment is 
then made by the exporter’s bank to the exporter (Step 3).  letters of credit are particularly suitable 
for international contracts that are risky because the creditworthiness of the foreign counterparty is 
hard to evaluate and contracts may be difficult to enforce.
Importer’s Bank
(issuing Bank)
important instrument after the breakup of 
the USSR.
With forfeiting, the exporter remits guar-
anteed debt from a sale on credit to a third 
party (financial firm) that pays the seller in 
cash upfront the face value of debt minus a 
discount.  The seller is then no longer liable for 
default of the importer when debt comes to 
maturity.  The discount is essentially the price 
the exporter is willing to pay in order to trans-
fer the risk of default to the financial firm. 
Other instruments carry out an insur-
ance function against the risks involved in 
international and domestic trade, chiefly 
price or currency fluctuations.  Examples 
of such contracts are options, forward 
contracts, futures, swaps and spot contracts.  
They offer the exporter and the importer the 
FIGURE 2
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possibility to insure against the risk of fluc-
tuations in exchange rates or prices, which 
would cause them a loss. 
Finally, there are many situations in 
which instruments are provided by gov-
ernments and government-related institu-
tions; these types of support should also 
be considered part of trade finance.  One 
such institution is the export credit insur-
ance agency, also known as an investment 
insurance agency.  These organizations act 
as intermediaries between national govern-
ments and exporters, offering financial and 
insurance services to protect trade partners 
against various types of risks, ranging from 
currency fluctuations to riots and other 
political distress.  These agencies may pro-
vide short (for up to 180 days) or long (for 
up to three years) term insurance to export-
ers, providing exporters with the necessary 
credit to cover production and transporta-
tion costs.  Certain central banks provide 
refinancing schemes through which they 
discount the commercial bills of exporters at 
preferential rates; these refinancing schemes 
work in a way similar to forfeiting.  Finally, 
specialized financial agencies, such as the 
Export-Import Bank in the U.S., specifically 
target exporters’ and importers’ needs. 
Data on these instruments are hard to 
come by.
6  Nevertheless, a growing body of 
economic research has started to provide 
evidence on the collective impact of these 
instruments on export activities.  Some of 
this evidence precedes the recent financial 
crisis.  Some other evidence refers to large 
crises, such as the recent global recession.
What’s the Evidence?
Trade economists are particularly 
interested in explaining why only a small 
percentage of firms in a country export (the 
economists call the number of exporters  
the extensive margin), in addition to 
explaining how much each firm exports 
(they call the size of individual exports the 
intensive margin).  Trade finance influences 
firms’ export status in two ways.  First, it 
may affect the probability of a business 
becoming an exporter in the first place if 
that business needs financing to pay fixed 
and sunk costs in order to start export-
ing.  Second, trade finance may affect the 
magnitude of foreign sales because financ-
ing variable export costs may also require 
external finance. 
To understand how finance affects the 
number of exporters and the size of their 
sales, economist Kalina Manova exploits 
the fact that (i) different industries tend 
to rely with different intensity on external 
finance, and (ii) the cost and availability of 
credit vary across countries.
7  The researcher 
shows that countries in which credit is either 
more difficult or more expensive to obtain 
tend to export less, especially in industries 
that rely more heavily on external finance.  
Economists Nicolas Berman and Jérôme 
Héricourt study the relationship between 
trade and finance using firm-level survey 
data from nine emerging and developing 
countries from the World Bank.
8  They show 
that firms’ financial health raises neither the 
probability of remaining an exporter once 
the firm has entered international markets 
nor the size of exports.  However, access to 
finance affects the probability of becoming 
an exporter.  They also show that the level of 
financial development of a country—not just 
an individual firm’s access to credit—can 
affect the probability of starting to export.
In addition to these two studies, there are 
many recent contributions confirming the 
important role of trade finance in influenc-
ing the number of exporters and how much 
they export.  One major challenge of these 
studies is to avoid confusing the role of 
finance with the role of changes in demand 
for exporters’ products.  This distinction 
is important:  If banks reduce the supply 
of trade finance to exporters (for example, 
during a financial crisis), appropriate policy 
interventions can restore firms’ access to 
credit and allow exporters to continue sell-
ing abroad.
A recent analysis by economists Mary 
Amiti and David Weinstein sheds light on 
the relationship between banks’ health and 
firms’ export performance in Japan.  The 
Japanese banking system underwent a credit 
crunch in the 1990s and 2000s.  Many banks 
These organizations act as intermediaries between national 
governments and exporters, offering financial and insurance 
services to protect trade partners against various types of  
risks, ranging from currency fluctuations to riots and other 
political distress.
Related Reading on Trade 
Issues from the St. Louis Fed 
 
the trade Collapse:   
Lining Up the suspects 
A two-page article co-authored 
by Silvio Contessi in the April 2010 
issue of The Regional Economist.,  
See stlouisfed.org/tradecollapse 
 
U.s. trade springs Back
A two-page essay co-authored by 
Contessi in April 2011 as part of our 
Economic Synopses series.  See 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/ 
publications/es/11/es1109.pdf
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had a sizable amount of bad loans on their 
balance sheets and had a hard time extend-
ing new loans to their customers.  Amiti 
and Weinstein matched Japanese export-
ers to the Japanese banks from which they 
borrowed and constructed a measure of 
market-to-book value for all large Japanese 
banks.  In general, as the market value of 
a bank fell, it had a harder time extending 
new loans or rolling over existing loans.  
The researchers showed that there was a 
large disparity across Japanese banks in 
these measures and that such large differ-
ences can be exploited to estimate the effect 
of bank health on exports.  In particular, 
Japanese firms that borrowed from dis-
tressed banks contracted their exports much 
more than businesses that were borrowing 
from healthy banks.
Trade Finance during the Crisis
The conjecture in the aftermath of the 
crisis was that the tightening of credit to 
firms had depressed the intensive margin of 
exports (how much each firm can export), 
especially in the sectors more exposed to 
financial shocks arising from the financial 
crisis because they tend to rely more on 
external finance.  For example, several stud-
ies have shown that industries such as drugs 
and pharmaceuticals or plastic and comput-
ing tend to use much more external finance 
than industries such as tobacco or pottery.
There is consensus among economists 
that the financial crisis led to tightened 
financial conditions.  How much of these 
tightened credit conditions is specifically 
reflected in trade finance is difficult to assess 
because of the absence of data.  However, a 
survey jointly administered by the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund and the BAFT-IFSA 
provides some insight.
9  According to a 
recent IMF study of this survey’s confiden-
tial data, changes in trade finance condi-
tions were particularly pronounced among 
large banks that suffered most from the 
financial crisis and, consequently, were in 
greater need to quickly deleverage.
10  The 
survey also shows that, at the same time, 
banks increased the cost of borrowers.  The 
IMF/BAFT-IFSA Trade Finance Survey 
provides evidence that, particularly in the 
case of letters of credit and trade-related 
lending, the terms of credit offered by large 
banks worsened.
The drop in trade at the peak of the crisis, 
between October 2008 and January 2009, is 
shown in Figure 1.  The trade collapse was 
visibly much larger than the contraction in 
trade finance, seen in the red bars.  At the 
onset of the crisis (2007:Q4-2008:Q4), trade 
finance actually increased; even during 
the peak of the crisis (2008:Q4-2009:Q1), 
trade finance fell by only one-third rela-
tive to the collapse in the export of goods.  
There was much geographic variation, but 
the largest drops occurred in Central Asia 
and Southeastern Europe.  The situation 
remained negative but stable in the second 
quarter of 2009 and started to recover by 
the end of 2009 when Maghreb countries (in 
North Africa) and Middle Eastern countries 
(Emerging Asia) experienced the largest 
increase in goods exports worldwide. 
When interviewed about the perceived 
causes of the contraction of trade finance, 
the surveyed banks returned answers sur-
prisingly similar to the consensus emerging 
among economists.  Respondents identified 
the fall in the demand for trade activities 
as the major source of decline in the value 
of trade finance but attributed about 30 
percent of the fall to the reduced credit 
availability at either their own institutions 
or counterparty bank.
Conclusion
Two of the major difficulties regarding 
policymaking in the area of trade finance 
are the lack of reliable quantitative infor-
mation and the limited evidence on the 
relationship between international trade and 
trade finance.  Recent research and efforts 
in data collection, however, are fostering the 
understanding of this relationship and, ulti-
mately, of the potential impact of different 
policies that may limit the negative effects of 
financial crises in the future.   
Silvio Contessi is an economist at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis.  See http://research.
stlouisfed.org/econ/contessi/ for more of his 
work.  Francesca de Nicola is a postdoctoral 
fellow in the Markets, Trade, and Institutions 
Division of the International Food Policy  
Research Institute in Washington, D.C.
ENDNOTES
 1 See Contessi and El-Ghazaly.
 2 See Eaton et al.
 3 See Chor and Manova.
 4 See Hummels and Schaur.
 5 See Auboin. 
 6 Bank trade finance is based on idiosyncratic 
relationships with specific clients so that 
its availability and even its cost depend on 
a complicated relationship among client, 
counterparty and counterparty banks.  As 
there is much proprietary information about 
bank-client relationships, this information 
is rarely disclosed.
 7 See Manova.
 8 See Berman and Héricourt.
 9 BAFT-IFSA is the global financial services  
association formed by the merger of the 
Bankers’ Association for Finance and Trade 
(BAFT) and the International Financial 
Services Association (IFSA).
10  See Asmondson et al. 
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